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Two recent holdings from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit in Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp. have 
come under fire from members of the patent community. In Promega, 
the Federal Circuit held that i) 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) does not 
require a third party to "actively induce the combination" of a 
patented invention, and ii) that a single component can be a 
"substantial portion" of the components of patented invention. In 
this Article, I argue that the Federal Circuit decided these issues 
correctly in light of the policy considerations that went into 
Congress's enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) following the Supreme 
Court's unpopular Deepsouth decision. I further argue that there is 
no requirement of knowledge of a patent to find inducement under § 
271(f)(1), only knowledge of the infringing acts. Overturning these 
holdings would, in effect, have ushered in a return to the world 
immediately after the Deepsouth decision, before the 
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In 1972, the Supreme Court held Deepsouth Packing 
Company's building and exporting unassembled parts of a machine 
to be permissible, in spite of the fact that such actions would infringe 
upon the patents of Laitram Corporation Corp. had those parts been 
assembled in the United States.1 Concerning Deepsouth's activities 
                                                                                                                            
1 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 529 (1972). 
2
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in the U.S., the Court wrote, "[w]e cannot endorse the view that the 
'substantial manufacture of the constituent parts of (a) machine' 
constitutes direct infringement when we have so often held that a 
combination patent protects only against the operable assembly of 
the whole and not the manufacture of its parts."2 Because the Court 
found no direct infringement, it could not find contributory 
infringement.3 Criticism of the Deepsouth decision4 ultimately 
motivated Congress to amend 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) by adding sections 
(f)(1) and (f)(2).5  
In 2014, the Federal Circuit interpreted those sections, 
sparking criticism from the patent bar.6 Specifically, Promega 
Corporation v. Life Technologies Corporation7 held that 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(f)(1) does not require a third party for one "to actively induce 
the combination" of a patented device,8 and that a single component 
of an invention can be a "substantial portion of the components."9 
Notable among the decision's critics, Professor Jason Rantanen has 
argued that this holding are "probably erroneous—doctrinal 
developments",10 that the majority's first holding is an incorrect 
textual analysis,11 and that the second holding makes 35 U.S.C. § 
                                                                                                                            
2 Id. at 528 (paraphrasing Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 
936, 939 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
3 Id. at 526 ("[I]t is established that there can be no contributory infringement 
without the fact or intention of a direct infringement."). 
4 See, e.g., Neil M. Zipkin, Infringement and Assembly Abroad—Patent 
Protection Takes a Vacation in Deepsouth, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 662, 663–64, 
691 (1973). 
5 See 98 Cong. Rec. H28069 (daily ed. October 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. 
Kastenmeier intend to amend 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)); Patent Law Amendments Act 
of 1984, Pub. Law No. 98-622, § 101, 98 Stat. 3383, 3383 (1984) (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)–(2) (2012). 
6 Jason Rantanen, Promega v. Life Tech, pt. 2: Inducing Oneself, PATENTLY-O 
(Jan. 8, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/01/promega 
-inducement-ones.html. 
7 Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1350–57 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
8 Id. at 1351. 
9 Id. at 1356. 
10 Rantanen, supra note 7. 
11 Id.  
3
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271(f)(2) superfluous.12 
Proceeding in five parts, this Article examines this conflict 
in detail and supports the Federal Circuit's holding on these issues.  
Part II of the Article provides a technical background for the patents 
in suit in Promega. Part III of the Article addresses the details of the 
case: subsections III.A, III.B, and III.C respectively discuss the 
patents-in-suit, the accused products, and the majority opinion, 
paying particular attention to the two holdings relating to self-
inducement to infringe a patent and the meaning of "a substantial 
portion of the components." Part IV.A examines the concept of a 
continuum of acts required for indirect patent infringement from 
inducement to contributory infringement, with specific attention to 
the substantiality and scienter requirements for such acts.13 Part 
IV.B discusses the controversy over what constitutes a substantial 
portion of the components with respect to § 271(f)(1), and proposes 
an interpretation of the statute to resolve the issues raised in 
Promega. Part IV.C investigates the question of whether the 
Promega decision requires a third party who actually commits the 
infringement in order to find inducement. Part IV.D looks into the 
legislative history of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) with regard to knowledge 
of the patent being infringed, and ultimately argues that the statute 
requires only knowledge of the act that infringes, not knowledge of 
the patent, for inducement liability to attach. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
 The method of identifying patterns in DNA, called short-
tandem repeat ("STR") profiling, has become an important tool in 
forensic analysis of crime scenes and paternity testing.14 In order to 
obtain a large enough DNA sample, a technician must first make 
multiple copies of the DNA in a process called amplification; this is 
commonly achieved through a technique called polymerase chain 
                                                                                                                            
12 Rantanen, supra note 7. 
13 See infra Part IV. 
14 The Biology Project, What is a Short Tandem Repeat Polymorphism (STR)?, 
UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA, 
http://www.biology.arizona.edu/human_bio/activities/blackett2/str_description.h
tml (last visited April 2, 2016) [hereinafter Polymorphism]. 
4
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reaction ("PCR").15 Polymerase is an enzyme that copies strands of 
DNA.16 In order for polymerase to do its work, technicians use a 
primer or marker molecule to target the start and end, or locus, of 
the STR of interest.17 Traditionally, a technician replicates one STR 
at a time. This process can be time-consuming.18 The patents and 
accused infringing products in the case of Promega Corp. v. Life 
Technologies Corp. encompass methods for amplifying multiple 
STRs simultaneously, greatly increasing the speed of the process.19 
 
II.  PROMEGA CORP. V. LIFE TECHNOLOGIES (FED. CIR. 2014) 
 
A. Basis of the Controversy 
Promega owns four patents claiming methods for multiplex 
STR loci amplification.20  Promega is also the exclusive licensee of 
a fifth patent from the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der 
Wissenschaften (The Max Planck Society), known as the Tautz 
patent.21 
 The Tautz patent claims a kit for analyzing polymorphism in 
a DNA sample.22 This kit contains a) a mixture of primers; b) a 
polymerase; c) the G, C, T, and A nucleotides; d) a buffer solution; 
and e) template DNA.23 
 Life Technologies Corporation ("LifeTech") makes kits that 
include all of the limitations claimed by the Tautz patent.24 The kits 
                                                                                                                            
15 Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
16 Id.  
17 Id. at 1341–42. 
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
20 U.S. Patent No. 7,008,771 (filed Sep. 6, 2002) [hereinafter '771 Patent]; U.S. 
Patent No. 6,221,598 (filed Jun. 7, 1999) [hereinafter '589 Patent]; U.S. Patent 
No. 6,479,235 (filed Nov. 25, 1998) [hereinafter '235 Patent]; U.S. Patent No. 
5,843,660 (filed Apr. 15, 1996) [hereinafter '660 Patent].  
21 U.S. Patent No. RE37, 984 (filed Jun. 9, 2000) [hereinafter Tautz Patent]. 
22 Tautz Patent, supra, col. 16, l. 43–61. 
23 Id.  
24 Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 
2014); see also id. at 1350. 
5
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are used for multiplexing DNA samples, including but not limited 
to the STR combinations claimed by Promega's patents.25 LifeTech 
manufactures the polymerase component of the kit in the United 
States, and ships it overseas to a subsidiary facility in the United 
Kingdom, where workers assemble the polymerase with the 
remaining items to form the complete kits for worldwide 
distribution.26 In 2006, a predecessor company to LifeTech obtained 
a limited cross-license to the alleged inventions in the four Promega 
patents and the Tautz patent for "Forensics and Human Identity 
Applications."27 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
Promega filed suit against LifeTech in 2010 for direct and 
induced infringement, alleging sales of the accused kits in 
applications beyond those subject to the limited 2006 license.28 The 
District Court judge instructed the jury to evaluate induced 
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), including sales of "all kits 
made, used, offered for sale, sold within the United States or 
imported into the United States, as well as kits made outside the 
United States where a substantial portion of the components [were] 
supplied from the United States."29 LifeTech objected to the 
inclusion of the § 271(f)(1) instruction, arguing that because its own 
subsidiary owned the U.K. facility completing the final assembly of 
the accused kits, inducement was inapplicable: a company cannot 
induce itself to infringe a patent under § 271(f)(1).30 
The jury attributed all of LifeTech's worldwide sales to 
infringing acts in the United States, and awarded $52 million in lost 
profits to Promega.31 LifeTech moved for judgment as a matter of 
law ("JMOL") on damages for infringement.32 The judge granted 
                                                                                                                            
25 Id. at 1344. 
26 Id.  
27 Id. at 1356 (quoting the confidential licensing agreement). 
28 Id.  
29 Id. at 1345 (emphasis added). 
30 Id. at 1344. 
31 Id. at 1350. 
32 Id. at 1341. 
6
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LifeTech's motion and denied Promega's motion to reconsider.33 
Both parties appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit.34 
  
C. Majority Opinion 
 
Writing for the majority, Judge Chen decided that "to 
actively induce the combination" of an infringing device under 35 
U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) does not require a third party,35 and that "there 
are circumstances in which a party may be liable under § 271(f)(1) 
for supplying . . . a single component for combination outside the 
United States."36 The "single component" analysis interpreted the 
plain meaning of the words "substantial" and "portion."37 The court 
held that these words connoted importance and essentiality.38 
LifeTech's counsel argued that Congress explicitly chose the use of 
the plural "components" in (1), and the use of "component" in (f)(2), 
and that therefore, (f)(1) required "components" plural for 
inducement.39 The court rejected this argument, noting that they 
were used in different contexts.40 The court also highlighted 
subsection (f)(2)'s focus on inducement regarding any component 
"especially made for use in [a patented] invention . . . not a staple 
article or commodity suitable for substantial non-infringing uses."41 
Among the six findings of the Federal Circuit panel, these two have 
garnered the most attention of commentators in the world of patent 
law.42 Members of the patent bar community have argued that these 
holdings are erroneous and likely to be overturned by the Supreme 
                                                                                                                            
33 Id.  
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 1351. 
36 Id. at 1353. 
37 Id. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 1354. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)–(2) (2010)). 
42 Id. at 1351; see also Rantanen, supra note 7. 
7
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Court.43  
 
 1. Self-inducement Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) 
 
Relying on a strict interpretation of the statutory language, 
the Federal Circuit found that the object of the inducement is not 
necessarily a third party. Rather, it is the combination of infringing 
components that the word "inducement" applies.44 While the court 
acknowledged that the word 'induce' can mean 'to influence another 
person,' it took a broad view of the meaning of the word, citing the 
Oxford English Dictionary, "'[t]o bring about, bring on, produce, 
cause, give rise to.'"45 Further, the court noted that, in drafting § 
271(f)(1), Congress could have included the word another to 
indicate that inducement required a separate party, but ultimately did 
not.46 
Because there is a lack of clear precedent on these matters, 
the court went on to examine the legislative history of § 271(f), and 
found that "[i]n order to be liable as an infringer under paragraph 
(f)(1), one must supply or cause to be supplied 'all or a substantial 
portion' of the components in a manner that would infringe the 
patent if such combination occurred within the United States."47 In 
particular, the legislative history states Congress's policy goal in 
enacting section § 271(f)(1)  was to "prevent copiers from avoiding 
United States patents by supplying components of a patented 
product in this Country so that the assembly of the components may 
be completed abroad."48 The court noted, "it is unlikely that 
Congress intended § 271(f)(1) to hold companies liable for shipping 
components overseas to third parties, but not for shipping those 
same components overseas to themselves or their foreign 
                                                                                                                            
43 Rantanen, supra note 7.  
44 Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
45 Id. (citing VII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 888 (2d ed. 1989)). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. (citing Section-by-Section Analysis: Patent Law Amendments of 1984, 
130 Cong. Rec. 28,069 (1984) as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827, 5828) 
[hereinafter, Legislative History]. 
48 Legislative History, supra note 50, at 5828. 
8
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While LifeTech relied upon Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. 
SEB S.A. to argue that inducement requires a third party, the 
court distinguished SEB by noting that the case implied the 
presence of inducement of another party, because under SEB's 
facts, there actually was another party. Taken together, § 271(a) 
and (b) naturally presume a direct infringer, and one who 
induces that party to infringe.49 However, the court found 
analogies to § 271(b) to be of limited value because § 271(f)(1) 
lacks a companion statute regarding strict liability infringement 
like that of § 271(a).50 Accordingly, the court held that one need 
not induce another in order to be liable under § 271(f)(1).51 
 
2. "Substantial Portion of the Components" 
 
Congress also took issue with the Federal Circuit's finding 
that "there are circumstances in which a party may be liable under § 
271(f)(1) for supplying or causing to be supplied a single component 
for combination outside the United States."52 Here, again, the court 
relied upon dictionaries for the plain meaning of "substantial," 
finding that it equates to "'essential.'"53 In defining "portion" as "a 
part of a whole," the court found no support for the assertion that a 
portion need include a "certain quantity" of an invention.54 In other 
words, one component can be sufficiently "substantial" to satisfy § 
271(f)(1). 
LifeTech argued that the inclusion "substantial" within the 
statutory language "substantial portion of the components," suggests 
that a defendant can be liable under § 271(f)(1) only when they 
supply more than one component.55 The court rejected this 
                                                                                                                            
49 Promega, 773 F.3d at 1353. 
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 1353 (emphasis added). 
53 Id. (citing XVII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 67 (2d ed.1989)). 
54 Id. (citing AM. HERITAGE COLL. DICTIONARY 1066 (4th ed. 2000)). 
55 Id. at 1354. 
9
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interpretation, holding that 271(f)(1) applies to "a substantial portion 
of the components," not merely "the components" of a patented 
invention.56 In short, the action of the subject of the statutory 
language (the inducer), acts on the singular noun "portion," not the 
plural noun "components."57 
Next, LifeTech relied on Microsoft v. AT&T Corp,58 
highlighting two footnotes where the Supreme Court noted that § 
271(f)(1) and (2) differ in the number of components that one must 
supply to be liable.59 Yet the Promega court noted that LifeTech 
ignored the next lines where the Supreme Court discussed § 
271(f)(1) in the context of a single component.60 LifeTech then 
argued that, because the Supreme Court discussed § 271(f)(2) in the 
context of a single component, the court had implied that § 271(f)(2) 
applied only to combinations of more than one component.61 The 
Federal Circuit found this argument unpersuasive.62 
Applying this understanding to Promega, the Federal Circuit 
found that the polymerase component of the accused kit was a 
substantial portion of the components of the invention because the 
kit was useless without it.63 The court relied upon LifeTech's own 
testimony that the polymerase was "one of the 'main' and 'major' 
                                                                                                                            
56 Id. 
57 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1). 
58 Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
59 Id. at 1355. While the two paragraphs differ, among other things, on the quantity 
of components that must be "supplie[d] ... from the United States" for liability to 
attach, see infra, at 1760, n. 18, that distinction does not affect our analysis. 
Paragraph (2), like (1), covers only a "component" amenable to "combination."  
 Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the 
United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented 
invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such 
manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the 
United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination 
occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer. 35 U.S.C. § 
271(f)(1); see also  Microsoft v. AT&T, 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 1356.  
62 Id. at 1358. 
63 Id.  
10
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components of the accused kits."64 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit 
found that, without the polymerase component, the testing kit 
"would be inoperable because no PCR would occur."65 The Federal 
Circuit overturned the district court's grant of LifeTech's motion for 
JMOL, siding with the jury finding that LifeTech was liable for 
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1).66 
This decision left the post-Promega world with an 
inadequate understanding of what constituted a substantial portion 
of the components of an invention. Short of an accused infringer's 
admission, the Federal Circuit provided no factors or guidance to 
determine what constitutes a 'substantial portion,' whether it is 
merely something required to make the invention work, or 
something more.67 For instance, it is likely that the kit would not 
operate without the buffer solution, which is presumably a 
commodity. Yet the court did not address whether a commodity 
component required for the invention to function, or a component 
with no non-infringing uses could count as a substantial portion 
under § 271(f)(1).  
 
III.  DISCUSSION 
 
A. Statutory Landscape and the Indirect Infringement Continuum 
 
To support the Federal Circuit's finding that a single 
component can represent a substantial portion of the components of 
an invention, it is necessary to examine the different types of indirect 
infringement covered by the various sections of 35 U.S.C. § 271. 
Four separate subsections of 35 U.S.C. § 271 codify the law of 
indirect infringement—specifically subsections (b), (c), (f)(1), and 
(f)(2).68 These subsections represent a continuum of acts required to 
                                                                                                                            
64 Id.  
65 Id. at 1358. 
66 Id. at 1357. 
67 Id. at 1356. 
68 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2010). Subsection (c) discusses contributory infringement, 
which is itself a subset of the concept of inducement. 
11
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find indirect infringement with inducement represented by § 271(b) 
at one end, and contributory infringement represented by § (f)(2) 
and (c) at the other. Section 271(b) involves the act of inducing 
someone (arguably even oneself) to infringe a patent, and has three 
requirements—knowledge of the patent at issue, the intent to 
infringe, and an underlying act of direct infringement—in order for 
liability to attach.69 
By contrast, contributory infringement deals with the act of 
supplying components that are then combined to infringe a patent.70 
The statute explicitly requires that the supplier must know the 
components will be combined in an infringing manner to find 
contributory infringement.71 The applicability of each subsection 
depends on what the accused infringers, knew, intended, and 
actually did to bring about the controversy by both direct and 
indirect means.  
Despite the Supreme Court's decision, Section 271(f)(1) 
continues to occupy the murky middle ground at issue in Promega. 
However, the differences between (f)(1), (f)(2), and 271(c), coupled 
with the provision's legislative history, may speak to Congress's 
intent in considering what counts as a "substantial portion" of the 
components and whether inducement requires a third party. The 
legislative history also suggests that the Supreme Court ruling in 
SEB regarding § 271(b)'s knowledge of infringement requirement 
was never intended to apply to §271(f)(1). 
  
1. The Continuum of Acts Required to Find Indirect Infringement: 
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) to § 271(f)(2) 
 
At one end of the continuum lies § 271(b). U.S. patent 
holders seeking to enforce their patents in foreign countries often 
rely on the inducement theory in § 271(b) because it has exceptions 
to extraterritorial limitations and thus may extend the reach of U.S. 
patent law to foreign countries.72 The section's scant text contains 
                                                                                                                            
69 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 763 (2011); 35 
U.S.C. § 271(b) (2010). 
70 35 U.S.C. § 271(c); 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2). 
71 35 U.S.C. § 271. 
72 See e.g., Global-Tech Appliances, 563 U.S. at 754. 
12
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no requirement that shipment of components, substantial or 
otherwise, be involved in order to induce. Providing instructions to 
a party to use an item in an infringing manner may be sufficient for 
liability to attach under § 271(b).73 However, the subsection has one 
key limitation. Unlike direct infringement, which is a strict liability 
offense,74 inducement requires both knowledge—or, more rarely, 
willful blindness—of a patent and the intent to infringe upon it.75  
 At the opposite end of the continuum are § 271(c) and (f)(2). 
These subsections deal with contributory or contribution-like 
infringement, and its elements are decomposed in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of the elements of 35 U.S.C. §271(c), (f)(1), & (f)(2). 
271(c)76 271(f)(1)77 271(f)(2)78 
Whoever offers to sell or 
sells or imports 
Whoever without 
authority supplies 
or causes to be 
supplied 
Whoever without authority 
supplies or causes to be 
supplied 
into the United States in or from the 
United States 
in or from the United 
States 
a component of a 
patented machine . . . or 
a[n] apparatus for use in 
. . . a patented process 
all or a substantial 
portion of the 
components of a 
patented invention 
any component of a 
patented invention 
constituting a material 
part of the invention 
 that is especially made or 
especially adapted for use 
in the invention 
knowing the same to be 
especially made or 
especially adapted for 
use in an infringement of 
such patent 
 knowing that such 
component is so made or 
adapted 
not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce 
suitable for substantial 
noninfringing use 
 not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce 
suitable for substantial 
noninfringing use 
                                                                                                                            
73 Id. at 759. 
74 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (20152012). 
75 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011). 
76 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). 
77 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1). 
78 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2). 
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 where such 
components are 
uncombined in 
whole or in part 
where such component is 
uncombined in whole or in 
part 




outside of the 
United States in a 
manner that would 
infringe the patent 
if such 
combination 
occurred within the 
United States 
intending that such 
component will be 
combined outside of the 
United States in a manner 
that would infringe the 
patent if such combination 
occurred within the United 
States 
shall be liable as a 
contributory infringer 
shall be liable as an 
infringer. 
shall be liable as an 
infringer 
  
This decomposition highlights many similarities between 
subsections (f)(2) and (c), but also a few key differences. In 
particular, the phrase in subsection (c) discussing the kind of part—
a material part of the invention in subsection (c)—corresponds to 
the phrase especially made in (f)(2). This language provides some 
evidence of Congressional intent for purposes of interpreting 
"substantial portion of the components" under subsection (f)(1), 
whose statutory language and legislative history are otherwise silent 
as to what constitutes substantial. Further, § 271(c) deals solely with 
acts in the U.S. Congress directed the intent clause of subsection 
(f)(2) towards intent to combine components overseas, and the 
supply clause ties that intent to combine back to the shores of the 
U.S., which puts it within the purview of 271(b). 
  
B. What is a Substantial Portion of the Components? 
 
The majority in Promega held that a single component of a 
patented invention could constitute a "substantial portion of the 
components" under § 271(f)(1).79 Professor Rantanen, however, has 
                                                                                                                            
79 Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 
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taken issue with the majority's holding80 and cautions that this could 
greatly expand liability under the provision.81 Specifically, he 
argues "[the] 'especially made or especially adapted for use in the 
invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce 
suitable for substantial noninfringing use'" provision of subsection 
(f)(2) serves to narrow the scope of subsection (f)(1).82 Applying a 
strict textual interpretation to the facts in Promega seems to prove 
this view correct, provided that we assume that the accused kit 
requires all five components to function.83 If LifeTech were 
shipping just the buffer solution—a common commodity—
overseas, finding patent infringement based on the buffer would not 
seem like a correct result.  
 These criticisms of the Promega decision highlight the 
ambiguity of the court's interpretation of subsection (f)(1). 
However, both § 271(c) and subsection (f)(2) as well as the statute's 
legislative history strongly suggest that—although not stated 
explicitly—subsection (f)(1) is concerned with the infringement of 
material components of an invention, or components that are 
especially adapted to the invention, regardless of their commodity 
status. Because of this ambiguity in both the statute and case law, 
the task of threading the needle between these poles of the indirect 
infringement continuum is extremely difficult.  
Members of the patent bar community have proposed 
various fixes to Deepsouth's clarity problem.84 This Article focuses 
                                                                                                                            
2014). 
80 Rantanen, supra note 7.  
81 Id. 
82 Id.  
83 Tautz Patent, supra note 2. (The five components were: a) a mixture of 
primers; b) a polymerase; c) the G, C, T, and A nucleotides; d) a buffer solution; 
and e) template DNA). 
84 See, e.g., Neil M. Zipkin, Infringement and Assembly Abroad—Patent 
Protection Takes a Vacation in Deepsouth, 47 St. JOHN'S L. REV. 662, 663–64, 
691 (1973) (proposing a statute to overcome Deepsouth, "Whoever shall 
substantially manufacture in the United States so much of the unpatented 
elements of a patented combination that the patentable aspect of that 
combination is captured, and there exists no significant practical use for such 
manufactured items, other than assembly into the patented combination, and 
15
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on answering the question of what constitutes a "substantial portion 
of the components" by reading the word "substantial"—which 
means "quantity" according to its plain definition—to mean 
"material," which addresses the substance of the invention.85 Under 
this theory, the components must be especially adapted for use, but 
the §271(c) and subsection (f)(2) requirements regarding 
commodity status of the components would be removed.86 In effect, 
I would interpret section (1) as follows: 
 
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied 
in or from the United States all or a substantial material 
portion of the components especially adapted for use in of a 
patented invention, where such components are uncombined 
in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the 
combination of such components outside of the United 
States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such 
combination occurred within the United States, shall be 
liable as an infringer. 
 
The word "material" has support in early bills first proposed 
to fix the Deepsouth problem which read, "[w]hoever without 
authority supplies . . . the material components of a patented 
invention."87  Applying the facts of the Promega case to each of 
                                                                                                                            
such assembly, requiring only minor integration, does in fact take place abroad, 
shall be liable as a direct infringer.");.");."); Charles M. Kerr, Operable Versus 
Substantial Assembly of Patented Combinations: A Critique of Deepsouth v. 
Laitram, 26 STAN. L. REV. 893, 917–19 (proposing "Whoever, for export and 
without authority, knowingly makes and/or sells, within the United States and 
for use in a foreign country, but for minor final assembly and/or minor parts, any 
patented combination during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the 
patent.")..").."). See supra Part I for a discussion of the Deepsouth case. 
85 substantial, adj., relating to size, quantity, solidity, etc. OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com.du.idm.oclc.org/view/Entry 
/193050?redirectedFrom=substantial& (accessed March 12, 2016); material, 
adj., of or relating to matter or substance. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 
ONLINE, 
http://www.oed.com.du.idm.oclc.org/view/Entry/114923?rskey=v5dKH8&result
=1&isAdvanced=false (accessed March 12, 2016). 
86 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(c), (f)(2) (2015). 
87 See, e.g., infra note 113 (emphasis added). 
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these sections puts this rule to the test. Recall that the accused kits 
contained five components, only one of which LifeTech 
manufactured in the U.S. and shipped to the U.K. for assembly and 
distribution worldwide.88 If LifeTech had shipped other components 
overseas, would the result change? The following sections address 
the components of the accused kits in decreasing order of what 
would seem to be their special adaptation for use in the kit at issue 
in Promega. 
 
1. The Mixture of Primers 
 
 Supposing the primers were made in the U.S. and then 
shipped overseas, what would result if they were evaluated for § 
271(f)(1) compliance at different points along the indirect 
infringement continuum? Putting aside the question of self–
inducement, and assuming there is an underlying act of predicate 
infringement in the U.S. under § 271(a), § 271(b) could be sufficient 
to capture the sale of the primers to a party who then infringes the 
Tautz patent provided that Promega could show intent and 
knowledge of the patent as required by the holding in SEB.89 If those 
elements are missing or Promega cannot prove them, § 271(b) 
cannot stop LifeTech. Since the primers are leaving the U.S. and not 
being imported as a component, we can ignore § 271(c). While § 
271(f)(2) would initially seem to protect Promega because the 
primers are not a commodity and are especially adapted for use,90 
the provision has the same problem as § 271(b) with regard to the 
requirement of "intent and knowledge".  
By contrast, the proposed reading of § 271(f)(1) would require 
only that we determine whether the primers are material to the 
invention and were specially adapted for use in the kit. Based on the 
                                                                                                                            
88 Tautz Patent, supra note 21 (showing the five components: a) a mixture of 
primers; b) a polymerase; c) the G, C, T, and A nucleotides; d) a buffer solution; 
and e) template DNA)).) 
89 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 764 (2011). 
90 Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) (commenting on the laborious process for determining the proper set of 
primers that will multiplex the targeted set of STRs). 
17
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labor-intensive trial-and-error process which must be followed to 
determine which set of primers will multiplex the targeted set of 
STRs91, the primers are demonstrably an essential component of the 
invention.92 It will not work without them. The mixture of primers 
gets to the very heart of the claimed invention. Furthermore, the 
primers were especially adapted for use in the invention and mark 
the beginning and ends of the STRs, whose successful combination 
is a laborious trial-and-error effort.93 Thus,   the proposed § 271(f)(1) 
reading would offer protection to Promega. 
 
2. The Polymerase 
 
 Both the § 271(b) and the § 271(f)(2) analyses of the 
invention's polymerase component proceed in much the same way 
as for the primer mixture, and both have the same weakness of 
requiring predicate direct infringement in the U.S. to satisfy both 
"knowledge" and "intent" to infringe. I will not belabor analyses 
under these sections further.  
The proposed reading of § 271(f)(1) requires that we ask 
whether polymerase is material to the invention. The polymerase is 
material because the invention does not work without it; the DNA 
cannot be amplified without polymerase, a fact admitted by 
LifeTech's own witness at trial.94 The analysis becomes more 
complicated with polymerase, in considering whether it is a 
commodity item or whether it has been especially made or adapted 
for the invention. It is possible to take a commodity item and adapt 
it for a special use in a patent. This analysis has been summarized 
below.   
                                                                                                                            
91 Id.  
92 See supra Part II.  
93 See id. 
94 Promega, 773 F.3d at 1356. 
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Table 2. Inducement liability for polymerase under § 271(f)(1) (proposed) 
and § 271(f)(2). 
 
For a material 
component: 
Especially made/adapted Not especially 
made/adapted 
Commodity Liability attaches under 271(f)(1) 







Liability for inducement attaches 
under 271(f)(2), if Promega proves 
knowledge of the patent. If it 
cannot prove knowledge, liability 
attaches under 271(f)(1) (proposed) 
 
If polymerase is a commodity that has not been especially 
made for the invention, then liability will not attach under either § 
271(f)(1) or § 271(f)(2), because the commodity has substantial non-
infringing uses and has not been especially adapted. If polymerase 
is not a commodity, but has been especially made or adapted, then 
liability under § 271(f)(2) will attach, provided that Promega can 
prove scienter. If Promega cannot prove scienter, liability could 
attach under the proposed reading of § 271(f)(1). The key difference 
between the two is the question of scienter: whether LifeTech knew 
of the Tautz patent and its infringing acts. The test would thus satisfy 
the interests of the policy underlying patent law. If polymerase is a 
commodity that is adapted for the kits claimed in the Tautz patent, 
the proposed reading of § 271(f)(1) would protect Promega from 
LifeTech's activities altogether.  
 
3. The G, C, T, A Nucleotides95 
  
Based on the same reasoning as the analyses above, these 
molecules are material to the invention because the kit would not 
                                                                                                                            
95 Note that these nucleotides alone, being molecules found in nature, are not 
patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as affirmed by the 
Supreme Court in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, 
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) ("The Court has long held that this provision 
contains an important implicit exception. . . . ': [L]aws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas' are not patentable..."). 
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work without them.96 In order to replicate DNA, it is necessary to 
have the underlying nucleotide building blocks available97. 
However, this component would fail the especially adapted prong 
of the proposed § 271(f)(1) test because nucleotides are present in 
every living organism known to science and were not especially 
adapted for the kit. They also fall under the purview of § 271(f)(2) 
as having substantial non-infringing uses. This result aligns with 
common sense: shipping common components overseas for 
combination in an infringing product should not be seen as 
inducement to infringe. 
 
4. The Buffer Solution 
 
 As with previous components, the buffer solution is likely to 
be material because the kit cannot work without it; it is one of the 
claimed components of the invention.98 If the buffer solution were 
not especially adapted for the accused kit, the proposed 
interpretation of § 271(f)(1) would allow manufacture of the buffer 
in the U.S. for shipment overseas. Further, the solution falls under 
the commodity or staple exception in § 271(f)(2). In the case of the 
nucleotides, inducement liability could attach only where the buffer 
had been especially adapted. 
 
5. The Template DNA 
For purposes of the template DNA are certainly material to the 
kit.99 Under the proposed interpretation of § 271(f)(1), the question 
becomes whether the template DNA was especially adapted for the 
kit. Thus, if Promega "especially adapted" the template DNA for use 
in the kit, export for foreign combination would expose LifeTech to 
liability under the proposed reading of § 271(f)(1) even without the 
knowledge of infringement required under § 271(f)(2). Once again, 
this approach yields a fair result.  
 
  
                                                                                                                            
96 J.D. Watson & F.H.C. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids, 171 
NATURE 737, 737 (1953). 
97 Id. 
98 Tautz Patent col. 16, l. 43–61, supra note 23. 
99 See supra Part II. 
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 In each of the five analyses above, the proposed 
interpretation of § 271(f)(1) would not only fall in line with common 
sense, but would be consistent with the U.S. Constitution's aim "[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
. . . Discoveries."100 This interpretation would also protect a patent 
holder from having the key pieces of its inventions shipped overseas 
for infringing purposes— the exact situation Congress was trying to 
avoid when it enacted 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) to close the Deepsouth 
loophole.101 Further, it could provide added protection to patent 
holders who cannot prove scienter on the part of the accused 
infringer, which is in line with Congress's intent in enacting § 
271(f).102  
Such an interpretation would also avoid the question raised 
in Promega as to whether one component can be a "substantial" part 
of the invention. The quantity of the components should be 
irrelevant; rather, the materiality of the components is key. Suppose, 
for instance, that the preferred embodiment of an invention was 
comprised of a hundred parts, and an accused infringer exported 
ninety-nine non-material parts overseas for combination with the 
last part. Further suppose that the invention would not work without 
the last part. Under certain readings of § 271(f)(1), this would look 
like a substantial portion of the components and should allow 
liability to attach. Moreover, it seems absurd to hold someone liable 
as an infringer through the extraterritorial imposition of U.S. law if 
such parts are not required to make the accused device work. 
However, the proposed interpretation of § 271(f)(1), would not 
attach liability under such conditions. As such, the patent holder 
would be left with recourse to § 271(a), should the infringer import 
                                                                                                                            
100 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
101 Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) ("Congress . . . sought to 'prevent copiers from avoiding United States 
patents by supplying components of a patented product in this Country so that 
the assembly of the components may be completed abroad.'" (citing Legislative 
History, supra note 49, at 5828)). 
102 See infra Part IV.D.  
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the accused device into the U.S., sensibly limiting the 
extraterritoriality of U.S. patent law.  
Now suppose that one material part of the previous invention 
was made in the U.S. for combination with the other ninety-nine 
overseas. LifeTech's reading of § 271(f)(1) as introduced in 
Promega would not count such an action as infringement. By 
contrast, the proposed interpretation of § 271(f)(1) would catch this 
activity as infringement by attaching liability to the action of 
shipping a material piece of another's patent overseas for assembly 
to skirt U.S. patent law. Further, because § 271(f)(1) does not require 
knowledge of the patent, the proposed interpretation puts a useful 
tool into the hands of U.S. patent holders. As such, this would be an 
appropriate exercise of the extraterritoriality of U.S. law. 
 
C. Self-Inducement: Is it Infringement? 
 
One of the controversial holdings of the Promega case was 
that a party may be liable under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) for supplying 
a component even to onetself for combination outside the U.S.103 In 
other words, one could induce oneself to infringe a patent. The 
patent blogosphere criticized this decision;104 Rantanen in particular 
attacked the majority's textual analysis of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) as 
"deeply flawed."105 Both Rantanen and Promega's majority rely on 
dictionaries to examine the meaning of 'induce' under the 
provision.106 However, this view misses the larger points of the 
policy that Congress wished to effectuate when it enacted § 271(f)—
namely, to close the loophole left by the Supreme Court's Deepsouth 
decision. Overturning Promega would have brought about a return 
of Deepsouth, where infringers would need only set up "finishing 
plants" abroad to receive the components of a device that, once 
assembled, would infringe a U.S. patent.107  
                                                                                                                            
103 Promega, 773 F.3d at 1353. 
104 See, e.g., Rantanen, supra note 7. 
105 Id. 
106 Id.; see also Promega, 773 F.3d at 1351. 
107 Houston Patent Law Association, Comments and Recommended Changes 
Senate Bill 2504: "The Patent Reform and Modernization Act of 1973" 6 (1973) 
[hereinafter Houston Report]. Not sure about this one, check rule 13. 
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Rantanen rebuffed the Federal Circuit's argument that 
Congress could have added the word "another" to the statute if it had 
intended to restrict inducement to third parties108 by claiming that 
"[t]ypically, the principle is invoked in the context of a parallel 
statute."109 However, this view misses both the rich legislative 
history of § 271(f) and the continuum of indirect infringement that 
Congress has laid down over the years, with contributory 
infringement at one end—represented by § 271(c) and (f)(2)—
inducement at the other end with § 271(b), and § 271(f)(1) in the 
middle to apply to inducement to combine a substantial portion of 
the components of an infringing device.110 
Rantanen further noted the Supreme Court has required 
inducement of another in patent and copyright cases 
respectively.111However, Promega stands firmly within both the law 
as written and the intent of the Congress that drafted it.112 The 
Federal Circuit analyzed the plain meaning of the term "induce," 
construing it to mean "to bring about, or to cause."113 No version of 
the bill, the court noted, suggests that Congress intended to require 
the presence of a third party by adding the word "another" to the 
statute.114 In reviewing the legislative history, the court also found 
that Congress had focused on closing the loophole left by the 
Supreme Court's unpopular Deepsouth decision, not on a question 
of whether inducement is a three-party affair.115 
Any future decision which attempts to overturn the Federal 
Circuit's Promega decision would open a gaping loophole in the 
                                                                                                                            
108 Rantanen, supra note 7. 
109 Id. 
110 See supra Part IV.B. 
111 See id. 
112 See infra Part IV D. 
113 Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 
2014)  
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 1352 ("Congress . . . sought to 'prevent copiers from avoiding United 
States patents by supplying components of a patented product in this Country so 
that the assembly of the components may be completed abroad.'" (citing 
Legislative History, supra note 49, at 5828)). 
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extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent law. It would allow domestic 
companies to escape infringement liability under § 271(f)(1) by 
shipping infringing components to themselves, rather than to a third-
party. Because direct infringement does not apply abroad, § 
271(f)(1) determines instead that "[w]hoever . . . supplies . . . 
components . . . in such a manner as to actively induce the 
combination of such components outside of the United States in a 
manner that would infringe the patent if such a combination 
occurred within the United States, shall be liable."116 Would 
Congress have intended to treat more harshly a domestic company 
that shipped components abroad to a foreign company than a 
domestic company that shipped the components to itself overseas? 
Finding that inducement of the combination of infringing 
components, rather than focusing on the actor doing the inducement, 
would prevent such a result. 
 
D. Knowledge of Infringement Versus Knowledge of Acts 
 
1. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) does not require knowledge of the patent. 
 
When considering infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271, it is 
important to address the accused infringer's intententions, level of 
knowledge, and actions. For example, § 271(b), (c), and (f)(2)117 all 
require some knowledge of indirect infringement, either explicitly, 
or via Supreme Court precedent.118 Whether an alleged infringer 
knew they were infringing a patent, or whether they merely had 
knowledge of the acts that form the basis for the infringement is 
often critical. Whether the same can be said for section f(1) has yet 
to be addressed in any court.  
The text of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) suggests that an individual 
needs only to supply components that, when combined outside the 
country, would infringe upon a patent in order for infringement 
liability to attach.119 However, "[i]ntent and knowledge" of a patent 
are not explicit requirements under § 271(f)(1), nor has the case law 
                                                                                                                            
116 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2015). 
117 35 U.S.C. §§ 271 (b), (c), (f)(1)-(2).  
118 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011). 
119 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2015). 
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read them into the statute as it has for § 271(b).120 Under § 271(f)(1), 
it is the act of supplying the components, their combination, or 
hypothetical combination, to infringe a patent that attaches liability; 
knowledge of the patent is not required.121 
As an example, suppose that LifeTech had merely developed 
an infringing product in parallel to Promega with no knowledge of 
the Tautz patent. If, under this scenario, LifeTech sold this device in 
the U.S., its sales would be direct infringement under § 271(a).122 
Under the same scenario, however, if LifeTech shipped the 
components to outside the U.S. for assembly, liability would attach 
under § 271(f)(1), even without evidence of knowledge of the 
patent. On the other hand, if LifeTech knew of the Tautz patent and 
subsequently shipped its components abroad for combination, 
liability would attach under § 271(f)(2), provided Promega could 
prove LifeTech's knowledge of the patent. 
Requiring knowledge of the act which created infringement, 
but not of the fact of infringement itself, addresses concerns raised 
by critics. In his amicus brief in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB 
S.A., Ted Sichelman—Director of the Center for Intellectual 
Property Law & Markets, and Professor of Law at the University of 
San Diego—argued that presumably one would only need bury one's 
head in the sand and avoid looking for patents, and remain blissfully 
ignorant to the possible infringement landscape around him in order 
to avoid liability under § 271(f)(1).123 Ignorance of the law would 
become the ultimate defense as would-be infringers strategically 
avoided looking at patents as part of their clearance-to-practice 
activities. Provided the maker of an infringing widget knew he was 
making the widget,, whether he was aware of any patents infringed 
upon should be irrelevant.  
 
2. Congress Did Not Intend§ 271(f)(1) to Require Knowledge of 
                                                                                                                            
120 See Global-Tech Appliances, 563 U.S. at 764. 
121 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1). 
122 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
123 Brief for Sichelman, et. al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Global-
Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011) (No. 2010-06)),) at 33 
[hereinafter Sichelman Brief]. 
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the Patent or Intent. 
 
Reading intent into  § 271(f)(1) does not comport with the 
legislative history of the statute. In fact, the history shows that 
Congress considered, and removed, the intent and knowledge 
requirements from early versions of § 271(f), splitting the proposed 
sections into § 271(f)(1)—which has no knowledge and intent 
requirements—and § 271(f)(2), which had both.124 Without a 
requirement for knowledge of the infringing act, the bright-line 
difference between subsections (f)(1) and (f)(2) becomes intent.  
Is it logical to question that Congress intended § 271(f)(1) to 
require only knowledge of acts, not knowledge of infringement, for 
liability to attach? While such an interpretation would seem to fly in 
the face of the Supreme Court's decision in SEB regarding 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(b),125 the statute's legislative history supports the theory that 
knowledge of acts should be sufficient for liability. An early version 
of § 271(f) appears in a 1983 Senate bill; this version included an 
intent element and elided the "actively induce" element, but 
otherwise paralleled the current language of § 271(f)(1).126 The 
presence of intent in S. 1535, absent from the version of § 271(f)(1) 
that became law, indicates Congress considered intent in subsection 
(f)(1) before removing it. Moreover, bills seeking to fix the 
Deepsouth ruling appeared in various forms in the 98th Congress, 
all containing both elements of knowledge and intent.127  
In June 1984, the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association ("AIPLA") advised Congress to remove the knowledge 
                                                                                                                            
124 See also supra Part IV.B. 
125 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011) 
(holding that induced infringement requires knowledge of the patent in suit). 
126 S. 1535, 98th Cong. § 1 (1983) ("Whoever without authority supplies or 
causes to be supplied in the United States the material components of a patented 
invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, 
intending that such components will be combined outside of the United States, 
and knowing that if such components were combined within the United States 
the combination would be an infringement of the patent, shall be liable as an 
infringer.") (emphasis added); see, e.g., H.R. 4526, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 
4814, 98th Cong. (1984). 
127 S. 1535, 98th Cong. § 1 (1983). 
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requirement from the pending House bill.128 The AIPLA's argument 
centered on a potential plaintiff's difficulty in proving both 
infringement and a "knowing" state of mind on the part of the 
defendant.129 The AIPLA thought that requiring knowledge would 
allow an accused infringer an "easy escape" from liability and would 
essentially gut the provision.130 This recommendation was 
eventually codified as 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), without elements for 
knowledge or intent.131  
The AIPLA was rightly concerned that a knowledge of 
infringement requirement would lead to an "easy escape" for 
infringers.132 Its report to Congress noted that "[t]he holding in the 
Deepsouth Case enables domestic copiers to circumvent the 
protection afforded by the patent laws by taking simple evasive 
                                                                                                                            
128 AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT TO THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY (Jun. 13, 1984).("We recommend that 
the word "knowing" be deleted from line 5 on page 2 [of H.R. 4526, 98th Cong. 
(1983)]. Section § 271(f) like existing Section 271(a) defines activities which 
constitute direct infringement of a patent. If a patentee brings suit pursuant to 
Section 271(a), he must prove that the alleged infringer committed the infringing 
acts. A judge or jury decides whether or not the patent was infringed. Section § 
271(f) as drafted would require that the patentee not only prove that the alleged 
infringer committed the infringing acts and intended the combining of the 
material components outside of the U.S. but also that he did so 'knowing" that 
components when combined would "be an infringement of the patent." The 
existence of this state of mind in the alleged infringer would be extremely 
difficult to prove. Proof of infringement involves both facts and law and cannot 
be known until after a court determination. Therefore, for the patentee to prove 
that the alleged infringer "knew" would be an easy escape for the unscrupulous 
infringer and would effectively nullify the section. But more importantly, the 
reason § 271(f) should be added to the law is that patent rights should be 
protected whether an infringer finally assembles the infringing product in the U. 
S. or arranges to have it done in a foreign country. We see no reason to require a 
higher burden of proof in one set of circumstances and not the other.") 
[hereinafter AIPLA Report]. 
129 Id.  
130 Id.  
131 Id.  
132 AIPLA Report, supra note 134. 
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production and marketing tactics."133 Similarly, the Houston Patent 
Law Association warned of just such an effect of the Deepsouth case 
in 1973, writing, "[u]nder the Deepsouth holding, American 
industry is encouraged to construct 'finishing plants' overseas, . . . 
[t]his situation would allow an infringer to set up shop next door to 
a patent-protected inventor whose product enjoys a substantial 
foreign market and deprive him of valuable business."134 Is the 
construction of such a finishing plant anything but self-inducement? 
The Houston Report also made the argument that it is contrary to 
notions of efficiency and cost to force a patent holder to defend itself 
against an infringer in numerous foreign jurisdictions, rather than 
just the single infringing company in the U.S. inducing itself.135  
Further, Senator Strom Thurmond noted that the purpose of 
the early bills addressing Deepsouth was "[t]o declare it to be patent 
infringement to supply components of an invention patented in the 
United States for final assembly abroad if the purpose of the 
shipment abroad is to circumvent a U.S. patent."136 Nothing in the 
statute's legislative history suggests that the purpose of the proposed 
legislation was only to apply to inducement of others.137 The plain 
language "to circumvent a U.S. patent" applies to the situation of 
direct infringement.138 Congressional records make it clear that 
Congress wrote § 271(f) to overcome Deepsouth139—specifically 
the Supreme Court's determination that "[w]e cannot endorse the 
view that the 'substantial manufacture of the constituent parts of (a) 
machine' constitutes direct infringement."140 If § 271(f) was 
designed to overcome Deepsouth, it follows that it was Congress's 
intention that the new statute would construe the manufacture of the 
constituent parts as direct infringement. In its report on 98 S. 1535—
a predecessor to the bill that would become 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)—the 
reviewing Senate committee stated that "[t]he bill simply amends 
                                                                                                                            
133Id.; H.R. 6286, 98th Cong. (1984). 
134 Houston Report, supra note 107. 
135 Id.  
136 S. Rep. No. 98-663, at 1 (1984). 
137 Id.  
138 Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
139 98 Cong. Rec. H28069 (daily ed. October 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. 
Kastenmeier); see also S. Rep. No. 98-663, at 2–3 (1984). 
140 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 528 (1972). 
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the patent law so that when components are supplied for assembly 
abroad to circumvent a patent, the situation will be treated the same 
as when the invention is "made" or "sold" in the United 
States."141Making, selling, or using a patented invention in the U.S. 
is direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(a).142 This strongly 
suggests that Congress never wanted to exclude self-inducement 
under § 271(f)(1). 
Upholding the Promega decision would largely eliminate 
the practice of opinion counsel, which has historically been self-
serving. If a finding of infringement requires knowledge, alleged 
infringers could skirt the law simply by procuring an attorney's letter 
to show that they had a reasonable belief that their devices did not 
infringe.143 While the Supreme Court has eliminated the use of 
opinion counsel with regard to invalidity of patents, it has not 
addressed opinion counsel with respect to patent infringement.144  
Once the requirement for knowledge of infringement is removed, 
however, the loophole from infringement liability closes. 
Most practically, overturning the Federal Circuit in Promega 
would effectively invite such evasive production tactics as discussed 
in the AIPLA Report.145 Any company could simply set up an 
assembly subsidiary in another country in order to infringe to its 
heart's content, much to the detriment of American ingenuity and 
the patent provision of the U.S. Constitution.146 By gutting the law 
that was meant to overturn such tactics, Deepsouth would rise again.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit correctly concluded in Promega that one 
can induce oneself to infringe a patent, and that a single component 
can constitute a "substantial portion of the components" under 35 
U.S.C. § 271(f)(1). Presuming a continuum of indirect infringement 
                                                                                                                            
141 Sichelman Brief, supra note 128, at 34. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1929 (2015). 
145 AIPLA Report, supra note 134. 
146 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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ranging from 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) to 271(c) and (f)(2), this Article 
has proposed a new interpretation of § 271(f)(1) to find indirect 
infringement when a material portion of components of a patented 
device are shipped overseas for combination. This would focus 
attention on the importance of the components to the function of a 
device, rather than the quantity. The proposed interpretation also 
would require that the components be especially adapted for use in 
the patented device. Lastly, this Article argued that § 271(f)(1) 
requires only knowledge of the acts ultimately constituting 
infringement, rather than knowledge of the patent those acts 
infringe. Should the Supreme Court affirm the Federal Circuit's 




 Where possible, showing that an accused infringer 
knew of or intended to infringe a patent, should be 
the preferred course of action. This could allow a 
plaintiff to recover enhanced damages.152 
 Direct patent infringement in the U.S. is essentially 
a strict liability offense under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
An accused infringer operating in a complete 
vacuum, unaware of a patent, can still infringe it. 
 Under the current law, it is inducement to infringe a 
patent to ship a substantial portion of the 
components of a patented device overseas for 
combination, if that combination would constitute 
infringement in the U.S.  
                                                                                                                            
152 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012); see also Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Eleccs., Inc., 136 
S. Ct. 1923 (2016). 
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